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Abstract
The Concept o f  Private Finance Initiative (PFI) or Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) has been internationally implemented over the last two decades. In Malaysia, 
eventhough the involvement o f  the private sector in assisting with the provision o f  
public services and facilities is not new, only recently under the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan the government officially announced the implementation o f  projects using 
PFI scheme in order to promote greater involvement o f  the private sector in 
delivering public services (Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006). Consequently, a series o f  
PFI projects is now being implemented including some already under construction. 
However, little is known on the real nature o f  the Malaysian PFI. One o f  the aspects 
considered critical in the implementation o f  a PFI project is the need fo r  a public  
sector comparator (PSC) to demonstrate that the project can achieve value fo r  
money through comparing the public sector comparator (PSC) with the bid or bids 
submitted by the private sector. The study being reported herein focuses on the 
concept o f  PFI as practiced in Malaysia and the construction o f  a PSC. Given that 
under the Malaysian PFI, the PSC is yet to be established there is an urgent need for  
one to be constructed. In addition, critical issues concerning the transfer o f  risks and  
the determination o f  discount rate are also discussed. The study combines literature 
review on PFI and interviews with civil servants involved in the implementation o f  
PFI in Malaysia.
Keywords: Private Finance Initiative (PFI), value fo r money (VFM), Public
sector comparator (PSC), risk transfer, discount rate.
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INTRODUCTION
The terms of Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
and Privately Procured Infrastructure (PPI) have been increasingly used in many 
countries. Although different terms are used, the common general concept is about 
the collaboration between the private and public sectors with the private sector 
having significant responsible in delivering public services. This policy has been 
internationally implemented over the last two decades. It offers an alternative to the 
conventional procurement of public service infrastructure and services.
For a typical PFI/PPP scheme there are several unique characteristics such as:
i. Service focus -  the main difference is in the change from considering buildings 
and infrastructure as ‘assets’ to ‘services’ provided by the private sector;
ii. . Ownership -  the buildir gs are typically owned by the private sector during the 
period of the contract and leased back to the public sector client;
iii. .Risk transfer - some of the risk associated with the project must be transferred 
to the private sector. The determining factor of risk transfer is to transfer risk to 
the party who could best manage it;
iv. Innovation - an output specification is used in which public sector clients specify 
their requirements in terms of the services required. Then, it is up to the private 
sector bidder to come up with a design that meets the public sector client’s 
requirements. Thus, it gives greater flexibility to the private sector provider to 
adopt innovation which leads to value for money (VFM) optimization;
v. Performance -  the payment to the private consortium is based on the extent 
that the required service is delivered and the client’s standard performance 
requirements are met (Ball et al. 2001 and Turner & Townsend Management 
Solutions 2002).
In Malaysia, eventhough the involvement of the private sector in assisting with 
the provision o f public services and facilities is not new, only recently under the 
Ninth Malaysia Plan the government has officially announced the implementation 
o f projects using PFI scheme in order to promote greater involvement of the private 
sector in delivering public services (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006). Even though the 
first PFI project is now under construction, little information is publicly available on 
the true nature o f PFI in Malaysia. This study therefore aims at exploring the concept 
o f Malaysian PFI by conducting in-depth interviews with the relevant officers who 
are involved in executing PFI projects.
The principal aim for implementing PFI is to provide an improved form of 
public procurement which under right circumstances could yield improved efficiency 
savings and greater value for money than traditional procurement (Robinson 2000).
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In other words, for a project to go ahead with a PFI option, it needs to demonstrate 
better value for money when comparing the private sector bids with a detailed public 
sector comparator (PSC) (Treasury Taskforce 1997). In assessing VFM of a project, 
PSC is one o f the crucial elements to be considered. From Malaysian context, 
even though the government acknowledges the importance of VFM assessment in 
implementing PFI projects, a robust PSC framework is yet to be established (Ninth 
Malaysia Plan 2006). Realizing the significance o f having a valid PSC to accurately 
assess VFM, this study also attempts to develop an appropriate framework of PSC 
that suits the Malaysian environment. However, at this very initial stage the study 
only focuses on the principle components of PSC models for PFI projects established 
in different countries particularly the UK, Australia, and Canada. The information 
was obtained through a thorough review the official documents on PSC construction 
o f these countries.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of private 
finance initiative (PFI) in Malaysia. Section 3 offers information on the public sector 
comparator such as its definition, importance and also brief o f comparison PSC’s 
components between countries. Then, the following section (Section 4) discusses 
the controversial issues concerning the construction of a PSC. A special reference 
was made to the situation experienced by the United Kingdom. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the findings of this study.
THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE IN MALAYSIA
PFI is an essential economic policy that has been globally adopted as it is the 
current trend towards greater private sector involvement in the management, delivery 
and financing of public services (Dixon et al. 2005). It is a means c f  using private 
finance and skills to provide public services which were traditionally provided by the 
public sector. In the purest form of PFI contract the private sector is responsible for 
designing, building, financing and operating facilities based on output specifications 
determined by the public sector. In effect, the public sector does not own the assets 
but has the obligation to make reguiar payments to the private sector providers for 
the use o f facilities throughout the contract period of normally 25 to 30 years (Heald 
1997; Hall 1998 and Broadbent and Laughlin 1999).
The involvement of the private sector in delivering public facilities and services 
is not new in Malaysia. It existed since mid 1980s as a result o f the adverse impact 
of the world economic recession that caused government to seek assistance from 
private sector for the development and economic activities o f the country. Malaysian 
incorporated and privatization are among the economic policies introduced to foster 
the involvement of the private sector.
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Privatization is one of a vital component of the government’s economic policies 
which aims at reducing the government’s administrative and financial burdens. The 
Malaysian government officially embarked on privatization in 1983. The policy was 
aimed at fostering greater involvement o f the private sector in delivering public 
sector projects. Generally, privatization has been defined as the transfer of enterprise 
ownership from the public to the private sector. Kay et al. (1986, 2) identified three 
interrelated policies under the umbrella of the privatization program. These include: 1. 
Denationalization: the sale o f the public assets to the private sector; 2. Liberalisation 
or deregulation - the opening of the state activities to private sector competition and 
3) contracting-out or franchising - the contracting out of public provision to private 
firm. From the Malaysian context, the scope of privatization is even broader (Jomo 
and Syn 2003). The various modes of privatization applied in Malaysia include i) 
sale o f equity; ii) sale of assets; iii) lease of assets; iv) management contract; v) 
Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and vii) management buy-out (Economic Planning 
Unit 2006).
The government reported positive outcomes from privatization policy in 
helping the government to reduce financial and administrative burden and also to 
improve efficiency in the provision o f public services (Jomo and Syn 2003; and 
Siddiquee 2006). It was reported in the Eight Malaysia Plan that more than RM28 
billion of the government’s capital expenditure was saved as a result of privatization 
(Eight Malaysia Plan 2001).
Subsequently, in strengthening the role of the private sector as the engine of 
growth, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme was unveiled in Malaysia under 
the recent Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP). The PFI is formally defined in the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan report (2006) as:
'the transfer to the priva te sector the responsibility to finance and manage 
a package o f  capital investment and services including the construction, 
management, maintenance, refurbishment and replacement o f  the public sector 
assets which creates a stan d  alone business. The priva te sector will create the 
asset and deliver a service to the public sector client. In return, the private sector 
w ill receive paym ent commensurate with the levels, quality and timeliness o f  the 
service provision throughout the concession period ' (Ninth M alaysia Plan, 2006)
In brief, under the PFI project, the private sector funds and builds the asset, 
while it is the obligation on the part of the government is to purchase a flow of 
services over time rather than the capital asset that provides the services.
The principal objective for embarking on PFI in Malaysia is to revise and 
to improve on the implementation process of the existing privatization policy 
(Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006). As tabled in the 9MP, the PFI will be employed for 
infrastructure and services development projects in two situations. First, PFI will be
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utilized if it could make government projects more efficient, where risks and rewards 
are optimally shared between the government and the private sector. Secondly, PFI 
is to be used where government support enhances the viability o f the private sector 
projects in strategic or promoted areas (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006).
In a speech by the Second Finance Minister, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop at 
the Private Finance Initiative Seminar which was held on the 10th November 2006, 
he said that:
'..in the M alaysian context, we view PFI in the broadest o f  terms, as capturing a 
wide spectrum o f  options that lie between the two extremes o f  privatizations and  
government project
From the interviews with the government officials conducted by the researcher, 
it is understood that there are two formats o f PFI schemes in Malaysia. This similar 
information has also been announced by the Prime Minister o f Malaysia, Datuk Seri 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and was reported in the local news paper (The Star Online, 
20th July 2006).
In the first format, the private sector would construct the asset or building and 
leases it to the government for a specified fixed period o f time. A special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) named PFI Sdn. Bhd. has been set up to take on the responsibility 
for implementing the PFI projects using this format. This SPV is wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance. The PFI Sdn. Bhd. is accountable for executing 
government’s identified projects. Essentially, the projects are mainly the initial 425 
projects that worth RM20 billion which have been identified by the government to 
be delivered via this format o f PFI under the 9MP.
In terms o f finance, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) has been required by 
the government to provide loan to the SPV. The SPV (i.e. PFI Sdn. Bhd) will utilize 
this allocation from EPF to finance the selected contractors for the construction of 
the assets. Once the assets have been built and ready for operation, the SPV will 
lease the assets to the Federal Land Commissioner (FLC) which acts as a middle­
man between the ministry which has requested for the project and the SPV. In return, 
the relevant ministry (i.e. the government) will pay lease charges to the SPV through 
the Federal Land Commissioner. Throughout the contract the SPV will own the 
assets and will service the loans given by the EPF. After the expiry of the contract 
periods, the assets will be transferred to the government at no cost.
During the interviews the researchers were informed that in contrast to the first 
format, the second format requires the private sector to identify the projects that are 
deemed to be economically viable and would benefit the public to be executed via 
PFI schemes. Under this format the private sector concession is fully responsible for 
designing, building, financing and operating the public service facilities. In fact, this
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format o f PFI is similar to the purest form of PFI that was predominated in the UK 
since 1992. An example of project carried out using this form is the Second Penang 
Bridge project which has been awarded to UEM Group. The 24 km bridge which 
will connect Batu Kawan in Seberang Perai and Batu Maung on the island with an 
estimated cost of RM2.8 billion is currently under construction (The Star Online, 3 
August 2006). The bullet train between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore project which 
is currently under government consideration is another example o f project o f this 
PFI format.
Overall, PFI in Malaysia is a new and unique mechanism unlike other 
concessions that have been used in the past. As it is still at the early stage of PFI 
implementation, a constant review and revision to the current PFI arrangement in 
should be welcomed to improve the government’s approach to PFI in achieving the 
objective o f introducing the best of private sector s'cills and practices to contribute to 
a higher sustainable level o f development and economic growth of the country. Also, 
the government should seek advice from PFI experts both locally or internationally 
on the critical aspects o f PFI implementation that are still lacking such as the proper 
procurement procedures and the construction of public sector comparator that is 
crucial for the assessment of value for money of PFI projects since. As Malaysia is 
yet to develop a PSC, the following section provides information about PSC together 
with a brief analysis on the comparison of PSC between three countries (i.e. United 
Kingdom, Australia and British Columbia). Also, debatable issues on the reliability 
o f  PSC are discussed in the subsequent section.
THE PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
A PSC is defined as ‘a hypothetical risk-adjusted costing, by the public sector 
as a supplier, to an output specification produced as part of a PFI procurement 
exercise’. It is expressed in present value terms and is based on the recent actual 
public sector method of providing the defined output which invoives the estimation 
o f the construction costs, running costs and more crucially the value of risk to be 
transferred to the private sector (HM Treasury 1999).
The objective of a PSC is to promote full cost pricing at an early stage in the 
procurement process. Also, it acts as a benchmark and evaluation tool in ensuring 
efficiency o f the procurement process. A PSC is required for the assessment o f the 
value for money (VFM) of a PFI project. A project needs to prove as providing 
better before it can be delivered via PFI. VFM is assessed by comparing the costs 
o f the proposed PFI project against a public sector comparator (PSC). A project is 
considered to provide good VFM if the net present value o f the PFI bid is lower 
than the PSC. This is why PSC is needed. This importance of PSC is pointed out by
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Jeremy Coleman, the Auditor General of the UK National Audit Office (NAO). He 
states that:
‘The Public Sector Com parator (PSC) is a key part o f  the financial evaluation o f  
proposed PFI project. The PSC is an important guide to judgm ent o f  the overall 
VFM o f  a PFI p ro je c t.' (HM  Treasury, 1999).
More importantly, the derivation o f PSC is complex because it takes into 
consideration the qualitative factors such as risks involved and types and quality of 
services provided rather than concentrating only on the quantitative factors (Treasury 
Taskforce 1999: para. 2.3.3). The UK Treasury Taskforce (1998: para. 2.2.1) claims 
that the process of building a PSC inevitably focuses only on the factors that can 
easily be quantified and expressed in monetary terms. Other factors, notably risk 
transfer, service quality and wider policy objectives are less easy to quantify and 
may not be fully reflected in the comparator. Due to the limitations involved, the 
Treasury Taskforce (1998: para. 2.2.4) highlights that a PSC that is lower than the 
PFI bid should not always imply automatic rejection of the PFI bid.
In other words, in seeking for a more analytically rigorous VFM appraisal 
mechanism, VFM should not be considered as a pass or fail test before all other 
non-quantifiable factors which involve both the benefits and costs of the option have 
been taken into account (Treasury Taskforce 1999). A study on PFI VFM assessment 
by Mumford (1998) identified six sources of cost saving that could be achieved 
from PFI contracts as compared to conventional procurement projects which might 
help to achieve VFM. These include: i. clearer definition and specification of user 
needs; ii. more careful lifetime design and costing by the constructor; iii. speedier 
construction and commissioning; iv. More effective monitoring of contracts; v. 
incentives that better align effort with risk and rewards; and vi. decision making 
that better exploits asset compatibility. Moreover, the study by Arthur Andersen 
and Enterprise LSE (2000: 18-19) which was commissioned by Treasury Taskforce 
identified six key drivers to VFM as follow: risk transfer, output based specification, 
long term nature of contract, performance measurement and incentives, competition 
and private sector management skills.
Despite the need to consider the qualitative factors, PSC remains crucial in 
undertaking VFM assessment. In Malaysia, the PSC is yet to be constructed. This 
was acknowledged in the Ninth Malaysia Plan report as follows:
“As the evaluation and procurement process involved in implementing PFI will 
be more elaborate, particu larly the need to be clear about output specifications, 
maintenance, perform ance indicators and distribution o f  risks, an ejfective 
enabling fram ew ork fo r  implementation will be developed. In this regard, steps 
w ill be undertaken to establish the public sector com parator in evaluating the 
proposals and determining the value Jor money as com pared to the conventional 
approach" (Ninth M alaysian Plan, 2006: 230)
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When constructing a PSC for Malaysian PFI project, the government should 
consider incorporating both the quantitative and qualitative factors so that a more 
reliable VFM appraisal outcome is obtained. In contributing towards the process of 
establishing a model o f PSC for PFI projects in Malaysia, this paper briefly analyses 
the key components o f a PSC with reference to the PSC established other countries 
particularly in the UK, Canada, and Australia.
A comprehensive review o f relevant documents on PSC development in the 
UK, Australia and Canada revealed that there are three common core components 
o f a PSC. These include base costing, transferred risk and retained risk as indicated 
in Figure 1. For the PSC in Australia, competitive neutrality is explicitly considered 
as another key component. Competitive neutrality adjustments remove any net 
competitive advantages that accrue to a government business by virtue of its public 
ownership. This is to allow a fair and equitable assessment between a PSC and PFI 
private bidders (PPP Victoria 2001). Examples of competitive neutrality adjustments 
are insurance costs for assets and services that are typically not insured by a public 
sector entity as it was deemed from a risk management perspective to self insure the 
facilities. For PSC in Canada, this is called hidden or assumed cost and considered 
as part of an indirect cost element of the base costing.
Based costing is the estimation o f the basic procurement costs which covers 
capital costs and operating costs. Capital costs are costs needed to construct or build 
the facility. These include costs incurred for the design, construction, purchase of 
land, material, and plant and equipment. Basically, capital cost represents a huge
Figure 1
Comparison between PSC and PFI
Expected 
cost ($)
Transferred
risk
Based costing
Retained risk
PSC
Net present 
value o f  
service 
payments
Retained risk
PFI
Options
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cost component o f a PSC. The estimation of capital cost should reflect recent actual 
practice in the public sector using existing plans for a site or the likely approach.
On the other hand, operating costs are the costs of providing the services 
specified in the procurement over the contract period. These include full staff 
costs, raw materials and consumables, repairs and maintenance and administrative 
overheads. As the effect of inflation throughout the contract period may be significant, 
all costs should be expressed in the prices of the base year of the comparison (the 
effects o f expected future inflation should be excluded).
Another crucial but controversial component o f a PSC is the risk element. 
Gallimore et al. (1997) state that the distinction between reality and possibility is 
an essential element o f risk. More specifically, from a financial perspective, risk 
is taken to be the variance of returns around the expected return (Gallimore et al., 
1997). Pollock and Vickers (2000) argue that risks play a major role in determining 
the VFM of a PFI project. Froud (2003) h is a similar view on the importance o f risk 
in verifying the VFM achieved from PFI. Besides, he also points out the significance 
of risk in the accounting treatment of PFI projects.
There are seven principal risks relevant to PFI being identified by the Treasury 
Taskforce (1997: para. 3.21) in their publication, 'Partnership for Prosperity 
Design and construction risk; commission and operating risk; demand for volume/ 
usage risk; residual value risk; technology/obsolescence risk and regulation and 
legislation risk. These risks were also commented on in the Private Finance Panel 
publication (1996), ‘’Risk and Reward in PFI Contracts'. For each type of risks, there 
are three possible choices to be made: i) To be retained by the public sector; ii) To 
be transferred to the private sector; and iii) To be shared between the two sectors.
The underlying principle behind the distribution of risk among various parties 
under PFI schemes is that the risk should be taken by those most able to control it, 
and this will result in cost reductions brought about through increases in efficiency 
and innovations introduced by the private sector (Ball et al. 2000). In other words, a 
more efficient allocation of risk between the private and public sector would yield a 
greater VFM in the provision o f public services (Hall 1998; Bing et al. 2005).
Transferable risks are those that are likely to be transferred to private sector 
bidders. The type and number o f risk which are to be transferred need to be assessed 
on a project by project basis. The value of transferable risk in a PSC measures the 
cost government would expect to pay for that risk over the term of the project in 
a public procurement scenario. Alternatively, retained risks are those risks that are 
managed more efficiently within the government. For projects where retained risk is 
included in the PSC, its value will also need to be added to each of the private bids 
to allow a meaningful comparis )n.
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As PSC is expressed in present value terms, another main issue in developing 
a PSC, particularly with the VFM valuation is the determination of the hurdle rate 
to use for discounting the cash flows (Pollock and Vickers 2000). In other words, 
once all the components o f the PSC have been added up, they need to be discounted 
using an acceptable discount rate to reach at the net present costs before comparison 
with the net present costs of the private sector can be made. From a review of the 
official documents, it was realized that different countries apply different discount 
rates to work out the present value o f the clash flows. Furthermore, in Australia and 
Canada, various rates are used for the different sectors o f PFI projects available in 
their countries. Only the United Kingdom, applies a uniform discount rate across 
sectors though the rate has been changed from 6 per cent in the past to 3.5 per cent 
at present. Table 1 below indicates the discount rates use in the UK, Australia, and 
Canada.
Table 1
Discount Rates Used in Different Countries
United Kingdom Australia Canada
In the past 
Current
6% (real rate) 
Standard rate for all 
projects
3.5% (real rate) 
Standard rate for all 
projects
8.65% (after tax 
nominal rate) 
Standard rate for all 
projects
Different rates for 
different projects 
sector
Different rates for 
different projects 
based on private 
sector’s cost of 
capital
Generally, the selection of the discount rate for the net present cost (NPC) is 
a subjective issue and it requires an understanding o f the relationship between risk 
and return. Due to the subjective justifications for selecting an appropriate discount 
rate, the reliability o f the PSC is always been a subject o f criticism. The key issues 
regarding the determination of discount rate as well as the transfer of risks issues are 
discussed in the next section.
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CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ON PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR
One of the controversial areas o f a PFI contract lies in the transfer o f risk to 
the private sector. The process of risk transfer is central to PFI schemes because 
a privately financed option is unlikely to represent value for money before risk 
transfer. This is because as risk is transferred to the private sector, ceteris paribus, 
the cost o f the transferred risk is added to the PSC (Wynne 2002). This adjustment 
will cause the PSC value to be relatively more expensive than a privately financed 
alternative. For example, an evaluation o f the NHS hospitals under PFI scheme by 
Froud and Shaoul (2001) shows that a greater VFM is achieved when some of the 
risks associated with construction of the hospital and its subsequent management 
is transferred to the private sector provider. The finding from Arthur Andersen and 
Enterprise LSE (2000, 53) study also reveals that 60 percent o f the average ‘saving’ 
is contributed by the transfer of risk.
However, the amount of risk to be transferred is a matter o f ambiguity. This is 
due to the complexities involved in the valuation of risk. Risks need to be identified 
and their impacts on costs need to be assessed. It also requires the estimation of 
the probabilities and the re-examination o f the estimates using sensitivity analysis. 
Moreover, risks should be appropriately allocated between the private and the public 
sector. An inappropriate risk transfer will reduce the VFM achieved as the party 
will seek to alleviate the impact o f the risk by charging greater premium (Treasury 
Taskforce 1999: para. 2.4.9).
According to NAO (1999e: 52), the policy o f risk transfer has shifted from an 
early recommendation of ‘maximum risk transfer’ to an ‘optimal risk transfer’. At 
present, the principle governing risk transfer is that;
‘Risk should be a llocated to whoever is best able to manage it. Although there may 
also be po licy reasons to  encourage risk transfer, the aim is to achieve optimum  
risk allocation, not transfer risk fo r  its own sa k e '
In practice, risk is not a simple uni-dimentional commodity that can be 
costlessly assessed and completely transferred to the private sector (Mavston 
1999). The relationship between risk and VFM is that as risks are transferred to the 
private sector, VFM may rise until it reaches the optimum level, where any further 
risk transfer might cause a fall in the VFM. This is because risk transfer becomes 
inefficient since the private sector may be unable to absorb risk properly (Forshaw 
1999).
A study by Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) argues that there are uncertainties 
in the issue of risk transfer. The main qv^ries include the types o f risks involved 
in the PFI project, the risks that need to be transferred and the characteristics that
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demonstrate when a risk is actually residing with a particular party. Subsequently, 
the Treasury Taskforce (1997a: para. 3.23) concluded that;
‘As a general rule, PFI schemes should transfer to the private sector risks where 
the supplier can influence the outcome. The supplier is able to influence the 
likely performance o f  the building and its ser\>ices by the quality o f  the design, 
construction and refurbishment work undertaken. The quality and frequency o f  
maintenance also has an important bearing on on-going performance. Therefore, 
risks transferred w ill include design, build, financing and operating risks
Landers (1996) agrees with the idea and similarly suggests that PFI requires an 
appropriate transfer o f risk to the private sector, both through the design, planning 
and construction phases and in operation and also through a combination of payment 
mechanisms and specific contract conditions. Wynne (2002) also points out that 
there are two types of risk often cited as transferred to the private sector contractor 
under a PFI project. They are risks related to delay in completing the project and risk 
o f cost overrun for a project. Nevertheless, according to Mayston (1999) a large part 
o f the risk which the PFI contract may seek to transfer to the private sector relates 
to demand risk.
From the perspective of the IPPR, design and construction risk and operating 
cost risk should be borne by the private sector. While political risks which involve 
policy changes should be borne by the public sector. But, certain risks which 
are difficult to specifically allocate between the parties, such as demand risk and 
obsolescence risk, need to be appropriately shared among the two parties (IPPR, 
2001). Likewise, the research findings by Bing et al. (2005) suggest that the public 
sector should retain political risks as well as site availability risks. On the other 
hand, risks which are directly associated with the project itself should be transferred 
to the private sector.
Akintoye et al. (1998) carried out a research project aimed at obtaining 
feedback from three different groups involved with PFI projects (Public sector 
(clients), contractors, and lenders) on the issues o f risk burdens and risk analysis and 
the management of PFI schemes. The results from their questionnaire survey show 
that the respondents tend to rank most highly those risk factors that were highly 
related to their own business objectives. Also, the results show that all the three 
parties adopt different methods and techniques for risk assessment and approach 
risks in different ways. However, one thing they have in common is that all parties 
have insufficient knowledge of PFI to ensure its success. Similarly, Gallimore et al. 
(1997) prove that certain risks are differently perceived by participants. They also 
emphasize that an attempt to measure and expose these differences is a difficult area 
o f study because it involves the quantification of data that are frequently qualitative 
in nature.
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Froud and Shaoul (2001) and Wynne (2002) point out that even though issues 
of risk analysis and risk transfer are important in PFI, official guidance on how to 
calculate the risk transferred is insufficient. Moreover, publicly available evidence is 
also typically very limited. Their evaluation on a number of FBCs suggests that no 
valid methodology for risk transfer has been applied. As a result, different business 
cases use different methodologies to transfer risk.
Recently, a research study carried out by a group o f researchers commissioned 
by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (2004) suggests that 
even though risk transfer is the central element in justifying VFM, their investigation 
indicates that risks have not been transferred to the party best able to manage it. 
The study which evaluates the operational performance of PFI scheme in roads and 
hospitals also highlights that;
‘...rather than transferring risk to the priva te sector, in the case o f  roads DBFO  
has created additional costs and risks to the public agency, and to the pu blic sector 
as a whole, through tax concessions that must increase costs to the taxpayer and/or 
reduce service provision. In the case o f  hospitals, PFI has generated extra costs 
to hospital users, both sta ff and patients, and to the Treasury through the leakage 
o f  the capital charge element in the NHS budget. In both roads and hospitals 
these costs and risks are neither transparent nor quantifiable. This means that 
it is impossible to  demonstrate whether or not VFM has been, or indeed can be, 
achieved in these or any other projects  ’  (ACCA, 2004).
In short, the process o f attempted risk transfer itself may lead to long and 
complicated PFI contracts, adding to the evaluation, transactions, negotiation and 
monitoring costs involved, which can significantly reduce the attractions of privately 
financed projects.
The second controversial issue concerning a PSC is the determination of the 
discount rate for the purpose of discounting the PSC costs to get the time value of 
money of the costs. In particular, the use of a single rate to discount both public 
and private sector schemes would mean that the risk of both schemes is equal. 
Broadbent et al. (2001) highlight that some people argue that this may not be the 
case. Implicitly, these people assume that the public sector has a lower risk. The 
analysis by Grout (1997) reveals that the public provision is valued from the cost 
side that is the present value of the cash flows of the costs of the project. Whereas the 
private provision is from the revenue side; the present value o f the cash flows of the 
revenue of the project. Revenues are generally perceived to be more risky than costs 
and this implies that the public sector should use a lower discount rate.
In addition, the time profile of the expenditure incurred by the public sector 
might differ substantially between the traditional procurement and the PFI. The 
capital expenditure under traditional procurement is incurred as the investment
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project is undertaken, whilst under PFI the costs are spread over a 25 to 30 year 
period. When comparing the PFI against the PSC to determine VFM, the use of a 
relatively high discount rate, places more weight on the near future as compared 
with the more distant future, and this will result in a lower cost for PFI hence a better 
value for money. On the other hand, a low rate o f discount tends to favour the PSC 
or the traditional procurement.
As in the case o f the United Kingdom, Wynne (2002) claims that the 6 percent 
discount rate used since 1992 does not reflect the actual current economic situation. 
This is because the same rate has been used despite the significant fall in general 
interest rates over the last few years. There are various arguments that have been put 
forward with regard to the discount rate issue. Wynne (2002) in his analysis shows 
that none of the first 11 PFI schemes in the NHS would be considered to provide 
VFM if  the discount rate used had been changed to 5 percent instead of the normal 
rate of 6 per cent. Similarly, Gaffhey et al. (1999) use the case o f Carlisle hospital 
to prove the sensitivity of VFM to the discount rate used. Their study indicates 
that at a 6 percent discount rate, the PFI scheme is slightly cheaper than traditional 
procurement. However, when the discount rate is reduced by only 0.5 percent, the 
outcome o f the appraisal is reversed to favour the traditional method o f procurement. 
In other words, both Gaffhey et al. (1999) and Wynne (2002) demonstrate that small 
changes in the discount rate applied will vary the outcome as to which scheme offers 
the best VFM
Concerning this discount rate issue, Grout (1997) and Smith (1999) consider 
whether the use o f more sophisticated models such the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
or the Arbitrage Pricing Mode! could provide a better basis for deciding appropriate 
discount rate. Sussex (2001) claims that four per cent discount is a better reflection 
of the time preference rate. Subsequently, in January 2003, the Treasury had agreed 
to reduce the discount rate for the purpose of economic appraisal to 3.5 percent. 
However, there are still debates on these issues at present.
In light of the above critics of PSC, fundamental lessons should be learned 
from the experiences o f other countries and serious consideration must be given on 
the matters concerned when developing a PSC for the PFI projects in Malaysia.
CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of PFI in Malaysia under the 9MP is the continuation to the 
existing privatization policy which has been implemented since the early 1980s. As 
the implementation o f PFI in Malaysia is still at the infancy with only several projects 
currently under construction or at the evaluation stage, the government should closeiy 
look into the critical aspects o f PFI that are still lacking such an effective enabling
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framework and mechanism for procurement and evaluation process. To be specific, 
a PSC which is a crucial element in VFM appraisal is yet to be established. However, 
in developing a PSC framework for PFI projects in Malaysia, many factors need to 
be scrutinized to ensure its suitability to the Malaysian context. Also, a special PFI 
regulation body is essential to be set up to regulate and monitor the progress of the 
scheme.
Moreover, since a PFI approach is required to prove better VFM before it can 
go ahead, a great reliance will be placed on the technical judgments underpinning 
the PSC costings. The complexity involved in the development of the PSC has led 
to a greater inherent uncertainty and subjectivity associated with aspects o f the PSC 
estimates (Audit Scotland 2002 and Audit Commission 2003, 34). Wynne (2002) 
highlighted the value o f risk transferred to the private sector as one of the key 
subjective area in developing the PSC. Research by Pollock et al. (2092), Audit 
Scotland (2002, 68) and Audit Commission (2003, 35) proved that a better VFM 
of PFI option was only achieved when adjustment for risk transfer has been made. 
This is because the cost of the risk transferred to the private sector is added to the 
cost of the PSC and cause it to be higher. In addition, it was also claimed that the 
PSC has overestimated the finance cost o f public funding (Audit Commission 2003, 
34). Subsequently, the reliability, accuracy and relevance of the PSC have been the 
subject o f considerable debate (Audit Commission 2003, 37).
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